This paper empirically relates subordinate board structures with improved financial and social performance in microfinance institutions (MFIs). The research question is analyzed using a panel data from 23 microfinance institutions in Ethiopia over a period of 2006-2011. Random effects panel data estimation is applied to analyze the link between board committees and MFI's performance. In MFIs with larger than average boards, the findings demonstrate significant ties between financial and outreach performance and how their boards are structured. The structure of board committees moderates the relation between board size and financial and outreach performance measures. Importantly, board committee benefits MFIs through better operational self-sufficiency, lower operating expenses, greater outreach to customers, and outreach to poorer customers using average loan size as our proxy. Practitioners within microfinance sector, and those operating in advisory and regulatory roles to the sector could benefit from the argument advanced in the paper in that normative recommendation to restructure boards or establish committees requires reevaluating the board characteristics vis-à-vis the optimal monitoring, controlling, and advising needs of the institution. Prior literature focuses on who sits on boards, how large are the boards, and how independent are they. This paper advances our understanding of the structure of board committees and how this may affect the performance of MFI. This approach provides better representation of director's role and is thereby a good test of board effectiveness.
Introduction
Are sub-committees in boards of Microfinance institutions (MFIs) beneficial? MFIs as hybrid organizations strive to be financially sustainable and at the same time, to reach as many low income customers as possible. Constraining trade-off between these two organizational logics (Hermes et al., 2011) renders governing MFIs tricky (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Labie & Mersland, 2011) . Governance is further identified as one of the main risk areas in microfinance industry (CSFI, 2012) thus, calls for more research on boards as among the governance mechanisms, have been issued (Labie & Mersland, 2011) . This paper responds to these calls by studying the relationship between MFI performance and boards by examining the presence and types of board committees.
This question has, as far as we know, not been studied before in the microfinance literature.
Microfinance is acclaimed for reversing conventional banking procedures by eliminating the need for collateral through a system that lies in informal systems of credit (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2004 , 2005 . It has demonstrated tremendous potential and growth to become World's biggest banking market in terms of customers served (Vanroose & D'Espallier, 2013; Mersland, 2013 ). Yet, after decades of strong support, the microfinance industry is under increasing pressure to ascertain its contribution in poverty alleviation (Hudon & Sandberg, 2013; Périlleux et al., 2012; Copestake, 2007) .
Moreover, concerns include client over-indebtedness, inappropriate collection practices and high interest rates, resulting in researchers debating whether microfinance could actually end up having a negative effect for the clients (Schicks, 2013a (Schicks, , 2013b Vogelgesang, 2003; Chen et al., 2010; Morduch, 1999) . Global expansion of commercial profit oriented MFIs and transformation in ownership of MFIs from NGOs to commercial banks have also reinvigorated this debate (D'Espallier et al., 2017) .
Subsequently, stakeholders are demanding better accountability and responsibility from MFIs, making corporate governance a top priority.
As an important mechanism of governance, board of directors (boards) influence managerial discretion and behavior (Charreaux, 1997) and contributes to the acquisition of strategic knowledge and capabilities by promoting institutional learning (Apostolov, 2014; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Board effectiveness is influenced by its structure and inner working of its members (John & Senbet, 1998) . Klein (1998) suggests that active participation of directors in different board committees is what makes the board effective. Laux and Laux (2009) noted that the main work on boards is done in committees. They further argue that when various board functions are delegated to different committee, it implies there is a separation of tasks and functions on boards.
Several researchers have responded to the call for more knowledge on the governance of MFIs. The core interest of these studies has been the effectiveness of the link between board characteristics and MFI performance-such as board structure (Mori et al., 2013) , board diversity (Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Mersland, 2012) , board composition, CEO duality, and board size (Mersland & Strøm, 2009 ). These articles mostly look at how boards are structured and formed in terms of who sit on those boards, how large are the boards and how independent they are. None of these studies examine the functioning of those boards and whether organizing the board in committees has an influence on the MFI's performance.
We use data from Ethiopia, which we consider an advantage. A challenge in designing governance studies in MFIs is that these institutions are traditionally under high international influence . The formal governance system is therefore influenced and moderated by international actors that are often those that in practice control the MFI. Ethiopia in this case is different. While the microfinance sector in the country is large, it has been under little international influence and only Ethiopians are allowed as shareholders in MFIs. Moreover, most governance studies on
MFIs are based on international data covering several countries and heterogeneous types of MFIs (e.g. Mersland & Strøm, 2009) Controlling for endogeneity concerns, we find in MFIs with large boards that board committees favorably associate with performance. Accordingly, MFIs with large boards (denoting top 50% of MFIs in the sample) exhibit significantly better operational sustainability and lower expense ratio than their counterparts with small boards. These results suggest the use of board committees offsets the negative relation between larger boards and MFI performance. We interpret this finding to suggest that including committees is an operational approach to improve board effectiveness in larger boards.
In MFIs with smaller boards the costs appear to outweigh the benefits of board committees. Our empirical analyses also suggest that the impact of board committees on performance is conditional on the committee types and directors' roles within these committees. Differentiating between monitoring and advisory committees, we find that significant impact on the financial performance of an MFI has advisory committees. In general, our analysis suggests that the performance implications of board committees are especially sensitive to the size of the board and the number of committees.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 begins with overview of the development of microfinance in Ethiopia and Section 4 presents the data and methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses the results while Section 6 concludes.
Literature review

Boards and performance in MFIs
MFIs Boards serve two important functions for organizations which are monitoring the management on behalf of stakeholders and providing resources in terms of advice, counsel, link to other organizations and legitimacy (Apostolov, 2014) . Following the rise in demand for greater accountability and responsibility from organizations, governance done by boards has attained high importance among microfinance practitioners and policy makers (CSFI, 2012) as well as in the general banking sector (Manaseer et al., 2012) . The need for greater accountability has even been higher because of a series of events including unsustainable growth of the industry, transformation of MFIs in ownership, and the surge in commercialization coupled with high interest rates, over-indebtedness and hard-handed collection methods (Cull et al., 2007; Bastiaensen & Marchetti, 2011) . The crises in the industry in some parts of the world such as in India, Morocco, and Nicaragua due to rising debt stress among clients and unmanaged growth of microfinance have also revealed the potential of MFIs' services to harm clients (Gruérin et al., 2015) .
Optimal board structure in microfinance needs to address the unique challenges faced by MFIs. First, microfinance is a double-bottom line business that accommodate financial and social goals simultaneously (Hermes et al., 2011; Battilana & Dorado, 2010) . Adding to this is the diverse set of microfinance practices in terms of services offered, lending methodologies, ownership set-up, public regulation, and profit motives (Labie & Mersland, 2011; Mersland, 2009) . What constitute a good board structure for a cooperative type of ownership may not be appropriate for NGO-MFIs or for MFIs owned by shareholders.
In addition, legal systems provide boards with fiduciary duty and sole responsibility to oversee important decisions (Levine, 2004; John & Senbet, 1998) . In the face of challenges and complexity of this duty, Labie (2001) points out the need for MFIs to acquire directors who possess the integrity and competence required to discharge their responsibilities effectively. This implies that boards affect MFIs' performance, yet it is less apparent whether and how the functioning of the board improves performance (Christopher, 2010; John & Senbet, 1998; Klein, 1998) .
Literature shows that microfinance boards comprise mostly of independent directors as well as some stakeholder representation such as employees, donors, investors, creditors, and clients (Mori and Mersland, 2014) . Some studies have attempted to link board structure and characteristics, such as size, independence, stakeholders' representation and microfinance performance. Hartarska (2005) finds evidence that boards with larger proportions of independent directors attain better return on asset (ROA) and social outreach. The study also shows that donor representatives on board improve outreach to poorer customers but worsen financial sustainability. This result contradicts that of Mori and Mersland (2014) who found donors to improve both outreach and sustainability. They further find creditors to be beneficial while employees to hamper MFI performance. Mersland and Strøm (2009) , using a global dataset find financial performance improves when the board has local rather than international directors and when it employs an internal board auditor. Hartarska and Mersland (2012) find that a larger board, up to nine members, is beneficial for MFI performance. Mori et al., (2015) study the effect of board composition on the outreach performance of MFIs. They find that boards with independent, female, and international members achieve high outreach performance to the poor. All these studies mainly focus on board structure, composition, and other corporate governance mechanisms. So far, there is no study that has looked at the effect of committees in MFI boards.
Studies show board committees are related to firm performance. Klein (1998) finds evidences of positive relation between inside members' ratio on finance/investment committees and firm performance, and another study by Klein (2002) finds that audit committees are more effective in monitoring the financial accounting process of firms. Callen et al. (2003) study the effects of board committees in non-profit organizations.
Their results provide evidence that the percentage of major donors on finance committee, which oversee budgets and administrative expenses, is negatively related to the organization's administrative expenses ratio. Given the hybrid and complex nature of MFIs, we argue that boards roles are effectively done through committees. This was also suggested by CMEF, (2012) where by committees of MFIs boards are argued to be the workhorses of organizations.
Hypotheses
The board of directors' function is to manage and control firms in achieving their mission and objectives. Some boards choose to delegate authority for specific tasks to subcommittees accountable to the board (Klein, 1998) . Board committees assume different roles and responsibilities in institutions. Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) argue board committees function as a means of reducing communication and coordination problems and increasing observability of individual director's performance. Harrison (1987) also asserts that hierarchical boards can help mitigate problems associated with poor attendance of directors because these directors now have specific responsibility.
Consequently, committees help in mitigating not only cost of communication but also problems of social loafing and freeriding (Klein, 1998) . The specificity of responsibilities and identification of directors responsible for fulfillment of tasks, can improve board effectiveness. From the two broad board roles, committees can be grouped in advising committees which is grounded under resource dependence theory, and monitoring committees supported by agency theory. Commonly, auditing committee is created due to legal obligation. There is no legal obligation imposed on MFIs in Ethiopia to constitute board committees. Yet, the National Bank of Ethiopia as a regulatory agency actively encourage MFIs to setup board committees. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) assert that boards are responsible for bringing resources to organizations. Resources are brought through advice, counsel, bolstering the public image of the organization, providing expertise, linking the organization to important stakeholders or other important entities, facilitating access to resources such as capital and aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important decisions. All these obligations are done effectively through committees because of their smallness in size and possibility to focus on specific tasks. While there are often no regulations or guidelines, many firms have one or more advice (sometimes called strategic) board committees. In MFIs, these committees commonly include risk management, human resource management, fund raising, and executive committees (CMEF, 2012) . These committees involve in advising, reviewing and approving long-term strategies, plans and policies of the MFI (Rock et al., 1998) .
Advisory board committees
We argue that MFI's performance is linked to the directors' participation on the board's advice committees. The intuition behind this premise is straightforward: strategic and advice committees are setup specifically to address important issues potentially influencing the performance of the MFI. The committees are further established to assist the MFIs in meeting their dual objectives. Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) further point out that organizations where management is in greater need of advice, such as those with greater operational complexity, which should be the case of MFIs with hybrid objectives, managers are more willing to share information with board members. Therefore, we can test the linkages between these committees and the MFI's financial and social performance.
Hypothesis 1:
There is a positive association between the presence of board committees with advisory functions and MFIs performance.
Monitoring board committees
Monitoring committees are established to perform the oversight role of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Monitoring board committees are particularly concerned with alleviating agency conflicts between shareholders and top management. Shareholders want managers to work in their best interests, that is, to maximize their wealth.
Managers, in contrast, may maximize their own utility through the consumption of perquisites or the selection of suboptimal decisions. Such committees in MFIs monitoring committees constitute of audit, compliance, remuneration, finance and discipline committees (CMEF, 2012) . Audit committee is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the organization`s financial statements and the performance of the internal audit function (Laux & Laux, 2009) . In this regard, the committee may regularly meet with the institution's external and internal auditors to review the MFI's financial statements, audit process, and internal accounting controls. This helps alleviate the agency problem by facilitating the timely release of less biased accounting information by managers to shareholders, creditors, donors, and so on, thus reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
The remuneration and compensation committee determines and reviews the nature and amount of all compensation for top management of the organization. It helps alleviate the agency problem by constructing and implementing incentive and bonus schemes designed better to align the goals between senior managers and shareholders.
If monitoring is effective then MFI performance should be positively related to the percentage of directors sitting on monitoring committees. We thus hypothesize that the presence of monitoring committees helps boards to become better monitors, a sentiment endorsed by former research (Klein, 1998; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010 ).
Hypothesis 2:
There is a positive association between the presence of board committees with monitoring functions and MFI performance.
Board size and committees
Committees can be formed effectively when there are many board members. Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) suggest that the larger the board, the more committees it may want to have to ensure that all board members can serve on a committee in a meaningful way.
We therefore argue that high number of committees can be of greater importance in MFIs with larger boards. Similarly, Mori and Mersland (2014) evidence various stakeholders to be on boards of MFIs. This is due to the nature of the microfinance industry. In this case, when there are different stakeholders sitting on board it may lead to a higher number of members. Thus, it is more beneficial to have them sitting on committees to effectively contribute to the MFIs. We therefore hypothesize that: The poverty ratio of the country is 44.2%. Ethiopia ranks 170th out of 177 countries on the UN's Human Development Index. Uncontrolled population growth, environmental degradation, high unemployment, drought, low level of literacy, and limited access to resources are the causes of poverty in the country (Wolday, 2008) . millions, total saving grew from USD 4.6 millions to USD 250.88 and that of total capital grew from USD 5.39 millions to USD 214.62 millions for the same period under consideration. The financial and operational sustainability of these MFIs have improved significantly in the last five years (Wolday, 2008) . As per the reports of MFIs to NBE (as of December 31, 2007), 63% of the MFIs were profitable (Muluneh, 2008) .
Despite the fast growth of microfinance in Ethiopia, the general outreach in the country is still in short supply meeting only 20% of the demand (Wolday, 2008) . For most of the low-income population, poor farmers and micro and small enterprises, it has been felt that financial services are commonly characterized by high transaction costs for clients, commonly weak institutional base, weak governance and a nominal ownership structure as well as dependence on government and mother NGOs (Pfister et al., 2008; Letenah, 2009 ). The financial products of the MFIs are largely supply driven and meagre flexibility to accommodate demands of the clients.
Appendix A presents an overview of the microfinance sector in terms of the number of clients, total assets, loan outstanding for the top 10 MFIs in Ethiopia.
Governance system in Ethiopian MFIs
Strong corporate governance is important in the market economy in protecting the interests of diversified stakeholders and enhancing investor confidence (Lattemann, 2014; Feng et al., 2017) . In Ethiopia, the legal framework of the corporate system and the overall standard of corporate governance are weak. The governance system in financial institutions is under strict supervision and control of the National Bank of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian company law does not have adequate legislative provisions on governance issues related to the separation of supervision and management responsibilities, and on the board composition, independence, and remuneration in share companies. Specifically, there is a major credibility problem in the Ethiopian financial institutions regulatory environment, since the regulatory rules are enforced discriminately between state and private institutions (Tura, 2012; Ayele, 2013) .
Management and board structure of MFIs in Ethiopia
The directive enacted by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) number MFI/03/96 specifies the qualification of competency required to be the chief executive officer and board directors. Accordingly, the minimum educational requirement for the chief executive officer is first degree in the field of social sciences or equivalent in relevant field. S/he also needs to have a minimum of three-year work experience in a senior position in a financial or related institution. Directors sitting on the board of MFI are expected to complete high school education and preferably possess some managerial experience with a minimum age of twenty-five years.
Albeit this regulatory framework, in reality board members did not have the right mix of professionals to guide an MFI and support management and it is only few MFIs who manage to acquire highly qualified CEOs that meet these criteria (Wolday, 2008) .
Further, as Frezer (2008) revealed, the fact that the competency requirement for the board members is lower than the CEOs, the board may not be able to oversee and control the activities of the manager.
Ownership structure of MFIs in Ethiopia
Under Proclamation No. 626/2009, it is required that MFIs should be established with strict observance of Article 304 of the Commercial Code Ethiopia (1960) which demands MFIs to be established as share companies owned by Ethiopian nationals. As defined under this Commercial Code, a share company is a company whose capital is fixed in advance and divided into shares and whose liabilities do the assets of the company only meet. Only members of a company may manage the company. A company shall have not less than three or more than twelve directors who shall form a board of directors.
Currently, the ownership structure of Ethiopian MFIs reveals that major shareholders in the sector include regional government, NGOs 2 , clients 3 , associations, and private individuals and other companies (Frezer, 2008) . The findings of Frezer (2008) (Frezer, 2008; Wolday, 2008) .
Regulation and supervision of MFIs in Ethiopia
As part of the formal financial system of the country, MFIs are regulated and supervised by NBE. The revised proclamation enforces (No. 626/2009) provides legal framework that are deemed to protect small depositors, ensure integrity and stability, and promote efficient performance of the institutions (Yigrem, 2010 The purpose and activity of MFIs specified in the proclamation allow MFIs the opportunity to offer a wide range of financial services to the unbanked poor. Yet, as it has been the case since 1996, this proclamation prohibits NGOs from directly engaging in microfinance service provision and it reserves the right of determining the maximum limit of loan amount to the NBE. Despite its limitations, the prudential regulation of MFIs in Ethiopia has reduced market distortions, improved entry into the microfinance industry, encouraged saving mobilization, and improved performance, transparency and trust of MFIs (Wolday, 2008; Yigerem, 2010) .
Data and methods
Microfinance in Ethiopia: the context
Two decades ago, informal service providers and NGOs were dominating microfinance activities in Ethiopia (Wolday, 2008 The microfinance industry is going through changing trends including commercialization, ownership transformation, increasing supervision and regulation, competition, and other ethical dilemma on interest rates (Ashta & Hudon, 2009 ). These trends make microfinance governance complex and its analysis needs consideration specificities at micro and macro levels. Most governance studies in general and MFIs in particular are based on international data covering several countries and heterogeneous types of MFIs (e.g. Mersland & Strøm, 2009 ). Thus, the literature would certainly benefit from case studies and country specific analysis to better understand the impact of governance on MFI performance. Ethiopia provides interesting research context. The microfinance sector in the country is large and it has been under little international influence that provides a relatively robust indigenous governance system that allows comparison of the result of this study with similar studies. While the results are based on small sample size from Ethiopia which may limit its external validity, this study is relevant because it provides a springboard for future studies.
Data and variables
In 2012 Previous studies on Microfinance boards commonly use financial and social performances as dimensions of MFIs' performance (e.g. D'Espallier, Hudon, & Szafarz, 2013; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2009) . Similarly, our dependent variables are financial and social performance. Financial performance is examined using return on assets (ROA), operating expense ratio (OER), and operational self-sufficiency (OSS). ROA measures the extent to which total assets are used to generate returns. OER measure the efficiency of MFIs in managing cost of operations.
Here the lower value is better than the higher value. OSS measures how well the MFIs can cover its expenses through its operating revenue. We also use two indicators of social performance-Ln (borrowers) examining the breadth of outreach and ALS (average loan size) measuring the depth of outreach.
The independent variables are number of committees, advisory committees and monitoring committees. Advisory committees are finance, investment, technology advisory, and employee development committees while monitoring committees, include audit, nominating, compensation committees, corporate governance, and executive committees (Klein, 1998) . Consequently, we include a set of control variables. Table 1 gives definitions of all variables included on the study.
Corporate governance research suggests that the size and composition of the boards are important elements that determines the size and magnitude of firm performance.
Several studies emphasize how number of directors on the board can also affect the cohesiveness and decision-making of the board, leading to substantial concerns about the ability of the board to advise and monitor the management (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) . Mersland and Strøm (2009) suggest that larger boards in MFIs is negatively related to performance.
We argue that board committees are used, among others, to moderate the coordination, communication, and free-riding problems that can occur with larger boards.
On the other hand, the performance effect of board committees is not straightforward and may introduce information asymmetries among directors (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010; Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016; Chen & Wu, 2016) . Therefore, firms with small boards will develop fewer subordinate structures (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010) . This argument indicates that board size moderates the effect of committees on MFI performance.
Therefore, we use Big board dummy variable in our primary performance regressions to facilitate the use of this interaction term to explore the benefits and costs of committees. Big board is a proxy variable denoting MFIs' board size is larger than the median the number of directors on the board.
Board size is introduced in our regression models as a control variable to consider the extent to which the significant results may be the result of the interacting variables moving independently in parallel. We consider alternative specifications and statistical techniques as a robustness check. Specifically, we use OLS regressions and F-test for the combined effect of the main variables (i.e., Number Committee; Number Advisory Committees; and Number Monitoring Committees) with the moderating variable (Big board). We find our results are robust to these alternative methods. 
Model and analyses techniques
We run various tests. First we run descriptive statistics of all variables in order to see how the data set looks like. Next we run multivariate analyses using GLS random effects (RE) panel regressions with robust standard errors (Greene, 2012; Petersen, 2009) . The RE specification is preferable because it provides estimators that are unbiased, consistent, and efficient, whereas the FE estimators are not efficient (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002) . The Hausman test we run for all models also confirms the use of RE. Controlling for stable MFI and board committee variables, whether observable or not, RE reduces the risk of biases due to omitted variables. We use the robust option to correct for potential cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. In line with this, our basic estimating models can be presented as follows:
where Yit is the financial and social performance-i.e., ROA, OSS, OER, Ln (NAB) or ALS-for MFI i in year t, BCit board committee variables, Xit represents a set of control variables comprising board size, Ln (assets) that proxies MFI size, age and CEO duality. We add these firm specific variables and year dummies into the specification acknowledging for MFI's invariant characteristics and take account of firm heterogeneity. Finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error term.
We check the robustness of our results along three dimensions. First, we will experiment by substituting the number of board advisory committees and number of monitoring committees in our models with alternative proxy variables. Hence, in the robustness tests we use the fractions of directors sitting on monitoring committees instead of their number. Similarly, we use the fractions of directors sitting on advisory committees instead of the number of advisory committees.
Second, endogeneity is a common problem when analyzing the relations between governance and performance, at least in nonrandomized studies (e.g. see Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015; Arcot & Bruno, 2005; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; 2003; Baker & Gompers, 2003; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008) . Based on the result of a dataset of 405 MFIs from 73 countries collected from third-party rating companies' reports, Strøm et al. (2014) find little evidence endogeneity problem in microfinance. We argue that endogeneity that could be introduced by omission of significant variables is unlikely in our case due to all the MFIs we consider are from a single country (i.e.
Ethiopia) embedded in the same micro and macro environmental contexts.
Nevertheless, we include MFI controls in all our regressions.
Conceptually, the incentives of boards to form committees differ according to specific mandates committees will assume which may either be of advisory or monitoring nature, and also according to the choice of the firm which should also vary based on firm and board characteristics Ferris et al., 2003; Klein, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Harrison, 1987) . While we argue that the board committees should improve MFI performance, causality may actually come in the opposite direction. It is equally plausible that better performing firms have larger boards and more committees for different purposes (Newman & Mozes, 1999; Dechow et al., 1994) , suggesting that firm performance leads to formation of board committees.
Thus, reverse causality may potentially be driving our results.
We tackle this problem from several perspectives. We first investigate the relation of current board structure with future (next year) MFI performance. The one-year lag between the two variables should per se limits endogeneity problems. This reduces the simultaneity bias that explanatory variables are determined simultaneously along with the explained variable even more. We also experiment using a 3-year lags in our board structure variables for additional robustness check.
We also test for endogeneity in an econometric sense. We perform panel data version of causality test a la Granger in time series analysis. This test is used by Landier et al. (2012) and consists of running the following two regressions:
where Yi,t is the MFI i's financial and social performance at time t and BCi,t is the board committee variables at time t for the MFI i. If MFI performance influences an MFI's board choice, we should not reject the hypothesis that δ >0. On the contrary, if δ is not significant while b is, it has more economic sense to talk about the positive effects of board committee on performance. In Section 4.3, we perform these and other robustness checks to address endogeneity. Overall, with panel data and a set of valid control variables our estimations should at least vouch for reliable correlations and feasibly causality accounting for endogeneity of committee structures.
Empirical evidences
Descriptive evidence
In table 2 we evidence that the Ethiopian microfinance industry has total assets of USD 10,440 millions reaching out to more than 2.9 million active borrowers as of 2011. We also evidence high percentages of assets to be comprised by loan portfolio implying These results are consistent with the argument that MFIs utilize subordinate large board sizes to mitigate the co-ordination and communication problems as well as the free rider problem that could occur (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010) .
Econometric evidence
In this section, we report results from random effects panel data estimations of the relationships between board committees and financial and social performance. If committees strengthen board's functions by allowing directors to work on specific issues, then we expect their use to be positively related to MFI performance. We report the results from the random effect (RE) regressions in We also expect the number of committees to be of greater importance in MFIs with larger boards. To test this notion, we introduce an interaction term of the number of committees and board size (large Board) in all our specifications. The expectation is that the interaction term will have favorable coefficient. Consistently, our test confirms that number of committees (Hypothesis 3) is more important in MFIs with larger than average boards. We find MFIs with large boards appear to exhibit significantly better OSS and OER than their counterparts with small boards. These results suggest that the use of board committees offsets the negative relation between larger boards and performance. We interpret this to suggest that board committees are important tool in reducing the costs associated with larger boards. (4), the combined effect of number of committees and board size on ALS is negative (favorable) and significant at the 5% level. We also find similar result in model (5) that MFIs with large boards and more committees have a significantly superior performance in terms of serving larger number of clients.
Consequently, the empirical results should be interpreted by examining combinations of board size and committees rather than separately. Studies also document that organizations adjust their board sizes depending on their advising and monitoring needs (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008) . Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms in general form board committees to offset costs of larger boards and mitigate communication and coordination problems as well as free rider problems (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010) .
Next, we estimate whether the value impact of the boards differs if an MFI has advisory and/or monitoring committees. Specifically, we estimate the regression with the number of advisory committees and number of monitoring committees replacing the number of committees as explanatory variables. Table 6 presents the results from these analyses.
In Table 6 , the primary variables of interest are number of advisory committees, monitoring committees, the interaction of number of advisory committees and board size, and interaction of the number of monitoring committees and board size. Estimated coefficients on the number of advisory and monitoring committees in table 6, specification (1) for ROA and (2) for OSS indicate that the negative performance impact of board committees stems from advisory committees and not from the monitoring
committees. Yet, in specification (4) the performance impact of board committees stems from both advisory and monitoring committees. Though we find only a weak relationship in the ROA regressions, OSS and ALS regressions in Table 6 , the results support that the larger the number of advisory committees is, the less effective they become.
We also introduce an interaction term of number of advisory committees and large board. The results resolve the apparent negative effects of advisory committees. We find the interaction term is highly significant and this significance level surpasses that of the number of advisory committees as stand-alone term. Consequently, in four of the five specifications- (1), (2), (3) and (5)-the χ 2 -test for the combined effect of advisory committees is either positive or favorably negative OER and significant at 1% level. Moreover, specification (4) indicates that the negative social effect (larger loan size) of having advisory committees is netted out when the committees are part of a big board. As Table 7 shows, the number of monitoring committees improves OSS, OER and total number of borrowers in MFIs with above average boards (large boards).
Consistent with the findings of Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) consistent with previous studies that reveal that as a growing industry, MFIs need more strategic resources than monitoring (Mori & Mersland, 2014; Mori et al., 2015) . On the other hand, the level and intensity of board monitoring activity usually involves agency costs and outcomes of monitoring committees may not be apparent by the performance proxies under consideration (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010) . Table 6 : Advisory committees and MFI performance This table presents results from the analysis of MFI performance from the presence of Advisory Committees. The dependent variables are oneyear future ROA, OSS, OER, ALS and Ln (NAB). The expected favorable result for OER and ALS is negative. That is negative OER suggests lower expenses while negative ALS indicates better poverty outreach. Advisory committees include finance and risk management, saving mobilization, resource management, change management, and fund raising and other committees performing similar tasks. Monitoring committees is number of committees other than advisory committees. RE estimates of the variance corrected following a cluster-robust treatment of standard errors (heteroscedasticity-consistent) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels respectively. The total sample size is 23 MFIs with maximum of 129 firm-year observations. While we find some effects of board committees on social performance, it is evident that both advisory and monitoring committees appear to command larger average loan size (ALS). This could be attributed to the fact that our study focuses on regulated MFIs which are often evidenced to divert from their social missions (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011) . This would imply that the board of directors is selected based on financial skills as required by the central bank authorities and not based on social skills (Mori et al., 2015) . Moreover, even if the directors selected to be on board have social expertise, the MFI whose board they sit on is a regulated institution. This means their participation on board may be directed mainly to assist the MFI to financially perform well and to observe the central banking authorities and less towards helping the MFI to focus on its social logic.
MFI control variables including board size, Ln (Total assets), Age and CEO duality have some effects on both financial and social performance. Like previous studies, we find that the larger the number of directors the less effective the board will be (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . Similar to Hartarska and Mersland (2012) we find that MFIs benefit from scale economies, i.e. larger MFIs show healthier financial results.
Likewise, and naturally, larger MFIs reach out to more clients as reported in Table 6 .
Yet, this also seems to come with less focus on depth of outreach. As expected, MFIs with many years in the business have relatively improved ROA and OSS (Table 6 ).
These results are in line with previous studies, which show that performance improves over time as the MFI gains experience (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Hartarska & Mersland, 2012) . The negative coefficient on CEO duality implies that MFIs with more influential CEOs exhibit lower operational sustainability though duality appears to favor social performance as indicated by the negative and positive significant coefficients for the average loans size and number of clients served. This could indicate that a more powerful CEO has better opportunity to focus on the social logic of the MFI, a result that should warrant more research on the role of the CEO in balancing the double logics in hybrid organizations. In a separate analysis, we also the test the link between a risk committee which is classified as an advisory committee and quality of MFI loan portfolio. Table 8 above presents the result of the random effects panel data estimations of this relationship. As indicated in the table the full model is marginally significant at 10 percent. Using the PaR 30 as an indicator of portfolio quality the result shows that PaR30 is not affected by the number of advisory committees. Yet, following the argument that the number of committees is of greater importance in MFIs with larger boards, we find that our estimation of the relationships between advisory board committee and portfolio quality Big Board is negative and significant. We interpret this result to suggest that MFIs with larger than average boards and that have advisory committees appear to exhibit significantly lower PaR30. This finding is robust considering the relationship between board size and PaR30, in which case PaR30 is marginal but positively related to board size. These results suggest that the use of advisory board committees offsets the negative relation between larger boards and lower portfolio quality.
Robustness tests
The multivariate tests in the previous section are designed to see if MFIs with board committee exhibit superior performance than their counterparts. In this section, we report various robustness checks for the estimation method and variable specification. First, we address the possible critique that performance directly determines an MFI's governance choice hence invalidating the previous analysis by performing a panel data version of Granger causality test, a test used by Landier et al. (2012) and we use equation (2) and (3) specified in Section 3.3 for these tests. If MFI performance influences an MFI's governance choice, we should not reject the hypothesis that δ >0 and c =0. On the contrary, if δ is not significant while b is, it has more economic sense to talk about the positive effects of board committee structures on MFI performance. Table 9 shows indeed, it is not past performance that generated today's board committee choice. We find that the number of committees is insignificantly related to MFI performance almost in all the regressions. However, in the OSS, OER and ALS regressions we find that the coefficients of these variables are negative and significant at 10% level, suggesting that MFI performance has nominal reverse causality on the use of board committees. We further experiment by avoiding the simultaneous use of the two board committee types (advisory and monitoring) and dealing with only one of the two types at a time.
Considering the correlation between the number/proportion of board committee type and the number of directors on that same committee, variables measuring the fraction of committees and fraction of directors on each committee are regressed separately. In unreported results, we find that the results are consistent with our primary findings.
To check the possibility that outliers within 1 year may be influencing the results we tried by using 3-year averages for MFI performance. We find similar results (unreported) to those listed in tables 6. Overall, our robustness checks imply that our results are confirmed when we vary estimation method, alternative proxy variables, and regression specifications. Thus, our conclusions from the board committees and MFI performance sections seem to be robust. The regression results are available from the authors upon request. 5 In unreported robustness check, we considered the moderating effect of board size. The result shows that the relationship between the existence of committees and performance is moderated by board size and all the results remained consistent with our main results in Table 6 and 7 except for the loss of significance in few cases. Nevertheless, our conclusion remains qualitatively the same. In an additional robustness check, we also experiment by using longer lags in our board structure variables. Specifically, we applied a 3-year lag for board size, the number of committee, and the interaction term of committee and big board size. As Table 10 above shows, our results remained qualitatively the same to our main findings. Considering the shorter length of panel data used for this study, the 3-year lag we introduced to the board structure variables resulted in lower number of firm-year observations for this robustness check. Yet, to a largely extent our findings and conclusions remains robust.
Conclusions
This study examines the relationship between MFIs' performance and board committees. It argues that MFIs use committees to mitigate the co-ordination, communication, and free-riding problems that can occur with larger boards. Questions also exist as to the effectiveness of the link between the type of committees that boards create and improved MFI performance, focusing on the relative roles of advisory and monitoring committees. We test our hypotheses using twenty-three MFIs operating in Ethiopia during the period 2006-2011.
The main result shows that larger boards can be valuable if properly utilized. By looking at the number and type of committees and how they are linked with board size, we find evidence that boards have explanatory value for MFI financial performance and outreach outcomes. We find that the presence of committees by themselves not to be beneficial to MFIs performance. But when linked with large boards, we evidence positive financial and social results for MFIs. This finding implies that with large boards, it is likely that directors will be sitting on fewer sub-committees with advising and monitoring roles.
Our findings also suggest that the impact of board committees on performance is conditional on the committee types. Accordingly, after categorizing committees into monitory and advisory committees, we find that advisory committees have significant and favorable impact on the MFI's financial performance than its outreach to the poor.
This hints that board directors focus more on financial results than social returns. This could be because of the MFIs in our study are all regulated by the central bank. Central banks put guidance on what and how boards of financial institutions should be composed of (Mori et al., 2015) . The central banks also monitor and supervise financial institutions to make sure that they have good financial performance. Thus, boards and their sub-committees will monitor and advise MFIs while adhering to central banks regulations.
Our results further suggest that the use of board committees to offsets the negative relation between larger boards and MFI performance. The performance implications of board committees are especially sensitive to the size of the board and the number of committees and establishing board committees is an operational approach to improve board effectiveness in larger boards. Therefore, the trend towards normative recommendation to establish board committees may not be to the MFIs' advantage and that MFIs may wish to reevaluate their needs for committees based on the nature of the organization. In Ethiopian context, the central bank policy recommendation maintains that MFIs should constitute board committees. Yet our findings confirm that board committees offset the negative association that board size can have on MFI performance. Therefore, the decision to establish board committees should at least consider the advising and monitoring needs of the MFI's management.
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that some underlying factors may cause reverse causality. However, our tests provide consistent evidences on performance gains achieved from board committees. This study provides some evidences on the performance gains and/or costs of board committees. However, this does not put the issue of board effectiveness to an end. To understand more about board committees and their impact in microfinance we suggest that future studies take a multidisciplinary approach incorporating both qualitative and quantitative research tools. Future studies should also use a broader range of variables and with extended datasets. Moreover, multiple country studies are needed. Finally, more research is needed on how committees and committee functions evolve over time.
